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ABSTRACT

This paper investigates factors that affect gender-based differences in intra-household bargaining
power that are reflected in consumption decisions regarding the adoption of green technology.
Using data from the Indian Human Development Survey-II and a probit regression analysis, I
find that increasing the level of a woman’s education (a proxy for increasing bargaining power)
increases the likelihood of her household adopting LPG, the cleanest fuel option available. I also
create an experimental design to serve as a next step for future research and target data collection
on individual-level factors and environmental outcomes. The setup is for a potential intervention
that assesses whether there are gender-based differences in the propensity for men and women to
purchase improved cookstoves, given increased access to credit as a means to increase
bargaining power in the household.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Engagement with climate mitigation and adaptation rests in the hands of actors at many
differing levels of power and access to finance. This includes policymakers at the federal, state,
and local levels; NGOs, and members of the household. The actors on the receiving end of policy
interventions could adopt green technology at the industrial or the household level. In this paper,
I will center discussion around the strategies that have been employed to combat climate change
risks at the household level in rural regions of developing countries. I focus in particular on the
role played by women in the adoption of improved, environmentally beneficial technology. More
specifically, I aim to explore whether women or men in developing countries choose to invest in
greener technologies when their bargaining power within the household is improved through
increasing their access to credit.
Climate change arguably presents one of the largest threats to the stability of global
institutions and society in the coming century, exacerbating a number of issues central to the
broader development agenda as outlined by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These
include (but are not limited to) the eradication of poverty, ensuring gender equality for women
and girls, and ensuring environmental sustainability. The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5)
determined that at 1.5°C of global warming, risks to health, livelihoods, food security, access to
water and sanitation, migration, and economic growth that are a direct result of climate
variability and extreme weather events are projected to increase (IPCC, 2018). 1 The report also
notes that climate change is likely to increase the risk of displacement, particularly populations
that lack the resources to adequately plan for and deal with migration – namely, low-income

1

The IPCC is an international scientific body whose legitimacy is built on its emphasis on conservative estimates of
climate outcomes, has ascertained that there is little doubt that anthropogenic climate change (induced by human
activity) is underway. The IPCC’s most recent report outlined the impacts of 1.5°C of global warming.
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developing countries. In addition to this, low-income developing countries face increased risks of
ill health and magnification of drivers of conflict, such as poverty and economic shocks. The
report also notes that climate change impacts are expected to slow down economic growth, thus
hindering poverty alleviation efforts, prolonging existing poverty traps, and creating new ones in
developing countries. (IPCC AR5, 2018).
As noted in previous research, the populations who are exposed to increased risks of the
most negative outcomes (as mentioned above) are those who are least equipped to cope
effectively and in a timely manner – namely, those in developing countries and women (Smit et
al., 2001; Adger et al., 2003). Thus, there is a need for concerted efforts on behalf of the public
and private sectors on an international scale to address the threats posed by anthropogenic
climate change (i.e., climate change induced by human activity) to these vulnerable populations.
International multilateral organizations that provide funds and serve as facilitators of funding
assess the most efficient ways that public and private capital can be allocated to engage in
climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. 2,3
Funding for initiatives and policy proposals that address climate change come from many
sources, comprised of public, private, and market-based mechanisms. The ways in which the
range of mechanisms under these three umbrellas are organized is referred to as the global
climate finance architecture or regime. Actors within this framework include governments,

2

Climate mitigation change is defined by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) as “human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases” (UNFCCC
2010). Examples would include increasing efficiency of fossil fuels during combustion, shifting energy reliance
towards solar energy or wind power (reducing sources), and increasing afforestation efforts (increasing ‘sinks’ of
carbon that remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere).
3
Climate adaptation is understood as “adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected
climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (UNFCCC 2010). With
an eye towards implantation of development policy, Rodenberg (2009) also notes that adaptation can take place at
different levels of society and be influenced by different groups of vulnerable actors, not just international
policymakers and federal governments.
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private corporations (e.g. groups of experienced companies and financial intermediaries),
international quasi-government institutions (UN agencies, multilateral development banks), and
market- (e.g. carbon markets) and non-market mechanisms (e.g. subsidies). One example of
many is the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), jointly established between the World Bank and
regional multilateral development banks, has pledged approximately $6.5 billion towards
investments focused on “energy efficiency, low-carbon and renewable energy carriers, pilot
forest investments and new approaches to building climate resilience in vulnerable countries”
(UNDP, 2011). One of the proposed strategies to tackle climate change and make vulnerable
communities safer from future risk is encouraging the adoption of technologies that are cleaner
and carry more environmental benefits. Thus, there is a need to ensure that this capital is being
put towards policy interventions that have the potential to create the most economically and
environmentally beneficial returns.
Women are often at the nexus of vulnerability to climate shock impacts and using their
traditional roles in household management to mitigate those very impacts. Research shows that
the benefits of adopting green technology could be unevenly concentrated on members of the
household, particularly on women in the household – however, there is more work to be done in
formalizing a general theory of adoption and use (Jeuland & Pattanayak, 2012). Recognizing
this, policy briefs and analytical reports from multilateral organizations have begun to
recommend focusing climate change financing mechanisms on promoting global climate benefits
while simultaneously addressing sustainable development goals. For instance, a UNDP report on
climate change financing states that incorporating gender issues into all aspects of climate
change financing will “maximize the effectiveness and efficacy of climate change responses”
(UNDP, 2011). A UNDP training module on gender and energy notes that women face differing
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problems to men with regards to energy production and utilization of energy services that are
linked to traditional gender roles related to cooking, cleaning, and income generation (UNDP,
2013). As noted by Williams (2016),
“Women must face and deal with the adverse challenges of climate change with fewer personal
and social resources than their male counterparts. Yet, women are critical actors in managing and
maintaining their households, the community, the ecosystems and natural resources.”

To gain more of an understanding of how funds can be allocated most efficiently within a
household to encourage the adoption of green technology, I will look at how the effect of intrahousehold bargaining power differentials between men and women can be leveraged to
encourage adoption of cleaner household technologies.4 With this, I hope to further and
understanding of whether when given access to credit, women choose to invest in greener
technologies disproportionately to men.
This paper studies factors that affect intra-household bargaining relationships that are
reflected in consumption decisions that result in improved household outcomes, specifically with
regards to the adoption of green technology. To do so, I use a probit model to assess the
determinants of the adoption of a clean cooking fuel (LPG) in India. To supplement this
econometric analysis and provide scope for future research, I will create an experimental design
that can be used to test this theoretical model in a setting that measures whether a targeted
increase in access to credit (and thereby increasing a member’s bargaining power within the
household) has an effect on the adoption of improved cookstove technology in India based on the
gender of the recipient..

4

Here, household-level interventions aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and creating
environmental benefits can broadly be classified into four categories: improved cookstoves (ICs), off-grid energy,
reforestation (or alternatively, reducing deforestation), and improved agricultural technologies (including livestock).
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 The role of gender in household bargaining power and spending patterns
Keeping in mind the role of the household as an actor in engaging in climate change
mitigation, I will examine different models of intra-household resource allocation – that is, the
allocation of rights, responsibilities, and resources among members within a household – and
their subsequent policy implications with regards to shifting patterns of consumption towards
greener technologies. As Doss (1996) notes, households are the center of much of the economic
decision making that goes on in an economy. The intra-household allocation of resources is
characterized by both cooperation and conflict. Given a set of possible outcomes, household
members (for simplicity, here the members are assumed to be the male and female adults in the
household) have different sets of preferences for those outcomes. The outcome that is realized is
thus dependent on each member’s relative bargaining power. Though dependent upon a range of
factors, bargaining power can be said to largely be defined by the strength of the member’s fallback position, defined by Agarwal (1997) as “the outside options which determine how well-off
she/he would be if cooperation failed.” Thus, the better a member’s outside options, the stronger
their fall-back position, and the more bargaining power they have within the household.
Historically, researchers have conceptualized households through unitary models of the
family (Becker, 1965). These models assume that households operate as a single consistent
entity, where “household members seek to maximize utility on the basis of a set of common
preferences represented by an aggregate utility function, and a common budget constraint”
(Agarwal, 1997).
This unitary model of household allocation implies that, in terms of policy interventions,
it would be enough to provide a cash transfer to a household irrespective of the identity of the
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target/recipient and the desired outcome would be achieved. This framework fails to recognize
that targeting interventions of cash transfers or increased credit access to a particular member of
the household would increase their fall-back position, raise their bargaining power, and allow
them to express their differentiated preference more clearly through consumption (here
considered the household outcome).
Consequently, newer economic research has disaggregated preferences within the
household to create a collective household model that acknowledges: that often income is not
pooled; that demographic characteristics such as age, gender, and caste can influence the
preferences of individuals within households; and that depending on differences in preferences,
bargaining power, and information flows, cooperation can occur and render the unitary
household model an inappropriate for analysis (Doss, 1996; Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995;
Thomas, 1990; Thomas, 1993; Iversen et al., 2006; Ashraf, 2009; Duflo, 2003; Quisumbing and
Maluccio, 2003). Adding context to these concerns within the framework of development issues,
anthropological and economic literature suggests that collective household models are more
appropriate for households in developing countries, where households do not pool incomes and
where husbands and wives might receive differing income streams (both earned and unearned)
that would lead them to be responsible for different household expenses (Mammen & Paxson,
2000).
Given that economic analysis is gaining a propensity to disaggregate member preferences
within households, and that many micro-credit initiatives directed at women operate on the belief
that women invest in goods that increase household welfare, it is increasingly important to
understand the empirical claims that giving women access to credit is economically efficient.
That being said, programs that extend cash transfers and micro-credit to women implicitly
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acknowledge the role that women play in the household as agents of economic change (Duflo,
2012). A large body of empirical literature (discussed below) has looked at whether intrahousehold allocation is, in fact, affected by the identity (in this case, gender) of the recipient of
income.
There are two major components to interventions that aim to influence household
dynamics: proxies for bargaining power and proxies for household outcomes. As outlined by
Agarwal (1997), factors that influence the bargaining power of a person within a rural household
are primarily comprised of “ownership of and control over assets, especially arable land; access
to employment and other income-earning means; access to communal resources such as village
commons and forests; access to traditional social support systems such as of patronage, kinship,
caste groupings, etc.; support from NGOs; support from the State; social perceptions about
needs, contributions and other determinants of deservedness; and social norms.” Following from
this, proxies for bargaining power include used in experimental studies earned income, unearned
income (cash transfers), maternal education at low levels, labor force participation of women,
asset ownership (where assets can include land, savings, agricultural equipment), consumer
durables, businesses, and financial assets (Thomas, 1990; Doss, 2006; Doss, 2013).
Household outcome proxies largely comprise of children’s educational outcomes,
anthropometric measurements of children’s health, budget shares spent on food, budget shares
spent on alcohol and cigarettes, budget shares spent on household repairs, and expenditure on
healthcare. All of the household outcome proxies measured above can be broadly said to capture
changes in consumption – i.e., they serve as a measurement of the household’s well-being.
Consumption is preferred to income as a proxy for well-being because budget shares and
expenditure are bound to fluctuate less than income itself, since households tend to smooth
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consumption over time. Additionally, consumption better reflects the expression of preference of
individual members in a household more accurately.
Studies indicate that, relative to men, income and asset ownership in the hands of women
is associated with improvements in child health and larger expenditure shares of nutrition, health,
and housing (Thomas, 1990; Thomas, 1993). Doss (2006) uses a comprehensive measure of asset
ownership that encompasses farmland, savings, and business activity to demonstrate that
increasing women’s asset ownership increases budget share comprised by food and education
(Doss, 2006). Results from Hoddinott and Haddad’s 1995 study on household behavior in Côte
d’Ivoire suggest that, using a collective model of the household where bargaining between
members occurs, increasing the wives’ share of income results in a greater proportion of
household expenditure on food, while simultaneously reducing budget share spent on cigarettes
and alcohol (Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995). Similarly, also in Côte d’Ivoire, Duflo and Udry
(2004) find that rainfall shocks that increase the crop yields of crops cultivated by women tend to
shift expenditures towards food consumption, whereas there is no effect of food consumption
with shock-related output increases from crops cultivated by men. This again suggests that
women tend to divert funds towards consumption that benefits the entire family/household. 5
Some studies develop the collective bargaining model further by recognizing the
informational asymmetries that often occur within spousal relationships in households in
developing countries, and accounting for this imbalance within their experimental setups. For
instance, Iversen et al. (2006) find that though couples do not maximize surplus, the identity of
the member responsible for allocation matters, and that a greater proportion of potential surplus

The literature relies on an “inferential approach” that assumes that due to a significant change in a certain outcome
resulting from an increase in women’s bargaining power, it is safe to infer that the outcome achieved is indeed the
preferred one (Thomas, 1990).
5
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was realized when women were in charge of the common income account. Ashraf (2009) tests
the effects of informational asymmetries between male and female household heads in the
Philippines by randomizing the level of communication between spouses. The study finds that
conditions of asymmetric information interact with existing household roles and divisions of
labor with regards to money management.
Though it is tempting to assume that mothers are more altruistic than fathers, it has been
suggested that there might be economic reasons for mothers’ preferences that are expressed as
increased investment in children. For instance, given the differentials between men and women
in age at marriage and life expectancy, one possible reason for this preferential outcome could be
that women invest more in their children’s education because they are more likely to rely on
them into old age than their husbands (Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2003).

2.2 Household-level developments in green technology
Having reviewed the literature on household bargaining models, I will now turn to a more
detailed discussion of the household-level green technologies that are under the umbrella of
improved household outcomes. Here, the consumption (adoption) of green technology within a
household is thought of as the household outcome. Understanding the different green technology
options available and the different benefits that can be conferred upon a household can inform
the structure of climate mitigation interventions, as well as informing the structure of
experiments aimed at data collection. In this section, I provide a condensed overview of
developments in four household-level green technologies: off-grid rural electrification,
reforestation, agricultural technologies, and improved cookstoves (ICs). Among the four, my
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focus is on improved cookstoves, given that ICs will be incorporated into the experimental
design presented in this paper.
Off-grid energy sources comprise of those that operate independently of the national
electricity grid. Though still circumstance- and location-dependent, off-grid energy sources at the
localized level are increasingly being considered as a viable potential means to electrify rural
households. Off-grid energy solutions represent a somewhat optimal solution in terms of their
ability to proliferate electricity provision with relation to a given project’s required investment,
efficiency and quality of service (Yadoo & Cruickshank, 2012). In addition, small-scale biomass
combustion for rural household energy use has the potential to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions (Creutzig et al., 2015). However, it must be noted that some critics have posited that
the potential increased reliance on biofuels might actually increase GHG emissions by
encouraging the growth of crops for fuel.
Reducing tropical deforestation in developing countries has the potential to significantly
reduce the cost of the global portfolio of climate change mitigation strategies, particularly
through the implementation of carbon payments programs (Seymour & Busch, 2016).
Additionally, household-level research in Uganda has shown that incentivizing forest-owning
households to change their behavior so as to reduce the amount of deforestation they engaged in
had a significant impact on slowing the decline of forest cover in the villages, as well as
generating program benefits that were 2.4 times as large as the program costs, making the
intervention cost-effective as well (Jayachandran et al., 2017).
Improvements in agricultural technologies tend to address either the role of livestock or
crop production. The benefits received by livestock interventions include “reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions, increases in productivity because of time saved, reductions in
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deforestation, improvements in children and women's health as well as reductions in public
expenditures within the health sector,” (Gill et al., 2009). With regard to crop production, studies
show that factors that influence the household uptake of climate adaptation strategies include
access to credit, access to information and education, government support by way of policy and
subsidies, education, and wealth/income (Bryan et al., 2009; Igoden et al., 1990; Lin, 1991;
Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007).

2.2.1 Improved cookstoves (ICs)
Studies have shown that domestic cookstoves hold significant potential as a point of
improvement in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Smith et al., 2000; Bruce et al.,
2000). For instance, Johnson et al. (2009) estimated the CO2-e (carbon dioxide equivalent)
savings for 603 homes in Michoacán, Mexico, to find that the cost of CO 2-e savings as a result of
the adoption of the IC was US$8 per tCO2-e, which is approximately 18 times less expensive
than solar power. 6 This study, as well as others, suggests that the relative cost of US$8 per CO 2-e
abatement, in conjunction with their significant health benefits, that ICs are a viable solution to
pursue as a relatively low-cost Black Carbon mitigation option (Johnson et al, 2009; Kar et al.,
2012).
A potential issue with cookstoves might lie with the way in which these technologies are
marketed towards consumers. The focus on mitigating health risks and costs rather than potential
environmental benefits when marketing to households might speak to a larger disconnect
between the adoption of broader collective benefits of adopting improved technologies and the
strategies employed to influence household decision-making or leverage existing power

6

For any quantity and type of greenhouse gas, CO2-e signifies the amount of CO2 that would have the equivalent
impact on global warming.
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dynamics within the household. Additionally, some research shows that in Bangladesh, relying
on the communication of health benefits of ICs was not the most effective way to encourage
adoption, since many women in rural Bangladesh do not perceive indoor air pollution as a
significant health hazard.
Jeuland and Pattanayak (2012) conduct a cost-benefit analysis of cookstove adoption at
the household level to assess potential contributing factors to poor uptake of IC technology. By
modeling private costs and benefits and then social costs and benefits, they show that households
switching from traditional stoves to improved stoves yield net private benefits in at least half of
the simulations. These improved technologies included improved wood-burning, improved
charcoal-burning, or electric stoves, LPG, and kerosene stoves, with LPG and kerosene stoves
yielding the highest welfare gains by magnitude. Additionally, Jeuland and Pattanayak (2012)
add the value of net value of carbon benefits to the private benefits they calculated to the
household, and find that (using the most conservative assumptions regarding emissions savings)
carbon subsidies are justified to promote adoption, thereby offsetting adoption costs that would
otherwise deter adoption. They also acknowledge that their study excludes “aesthetic benefits
and disamenities” that occur with different cooking options (Jeuland & Pattanayak, 2012). These
benefits, along with others (including health benefits), have the potential to be disproportionately
concentrated on women, given that women are usually responsible for cooking and food
preparation under traditional gender roles, thus allowing for women to have an increased
preference for adopting ICs over men. This, in conjunction with the potential for increased
bargaining power from increased access to credit from a policy intervention, would theoretically
make the adoption of ICs a useful specification for the study of a household’s consumption of
green technology relative to women’s bargaining power.
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3. MODEL
I have chosen to narrow the focus of this paper to the use of two proxies for bargaining
power: the empirical analysis uses women’s education as a proxy for bargaining power, and the
experimental design uses access to credit as a proxy for bargaining power. In both cases, the
adoption (consumption) of improved household technology as a proxy for household outcomes.
The experimental design outlined in this section will focus on women’s access to credit in India
as a proxy for bargaining power, and adoption of improved cookstove (IC) technology by a given
household as a proxy for the improved household outcome. While much of the literature has
focused so far on outcomes related to educational attainment and nutrition, this paper expands
the scope of household utility maximization models by incorporating the adoption of climate
mitigating household technologies into the umbrella of improved household outcomes by using
consumption of those goods as a proxy.

3.1 Theoretical model
The theoretical model that I employ draws upon the work of Hoddinott & Haddad (1995)
in their study of the influence of female income share on household expenditure using a utility
maximization model. Hoddinott & Haddad (1995) use a Nash equilibrium model to show that as
income share of one utility-maximizing member in the household rises, it is clearly reflected in
the pattern of household expenditure because the share of household income spent on that
individual’s preferred set of goods will rise. The theory suggests that if both the man and woman
in the household derive different utilities from green technology consumption, they would realize
different outcomes in the pursuit of utility maximization.
Thus, when one member’s bargaining power in the household increases, they have more
power for their preferences to be realized and reflected in household consumption decisions over
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the other member’s. The experimental design in this paper can be used to test this theory. By
increasing either the man or woman’s bargaining power through access to credit from
microfinance programs, we could test whether one has an increased propensity to purchase green
technology for the household over the other in the pursuit of utility maximization. 7 Given the
literature that shows that women’s set of preferred outcomes is likely to be more beneficial for
the household, I hypothesize that when green technology is included as a possible item of
consumption, women’s set of preferred outcomes will reflect the outcome that is more beneficial
to the household – i.e., the adoption of green technology.

3.2 Empirical model
3.2.1 Data
I conduct a regression analysis of the factors that influence the use of three different
commonly used fuels in India. The data are a part of the Indian Human Development Survey
(IHDS).8 The IHDS was conducted twice; the initial round was in 2005 (IHDS-I) and a second
round was carried out in 2011-2012 (IHDS-II) that largely consisted of re-interviewing
households from the initial survey. The IHDS is nationally representative, multi-topic survey of
42,125 households in villages as well as urban neighborhoods across India. Both surveys cover
all states and union territories in India with the exception of the Andaman & Nicobar and
Lakshadweep islands. Data from the survey was gathered through two one-hour interviews in
each household covered topics concerning health, education, employment, economic status,
marriage, gender relations, social capital, and more. The data form this survey are cross-sectional
and consist of measurements for individual observations (persons, households, districts, states,

7
8

A more detailed explanation of this theory is included in Appendix A2 for the interested reader.
The Indian Human Development Survey can be found at: https://ihds.umd.edu/
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etc.) at a given point in time. For this analysis, I only use data from IHDS-II. More specifically, I
use data from parts DS2 (Household) and DS3 (Eligible Women)9 of this survey.10,11 The IHDS
surveys are particularly useful for helping analyze human development indicators across a range
of social and economic dimensions – for instance, in this paper I analyze consumption (an
economic outcome) by considering the roles of education, gender relations, community context,
and economic resources.
Recently, the negative health impacts of traditional biomass stove (chulha) use in India
have been realized by the general public and the government. 12 Charcoal is one of the most
commonly used fuels for biomass stoves in India, and is the only type of biomass fuel included
in the IHDS-II survey. LPG has been shown to be the cleanest of the three fuel options,
addressing both the issue of indoor air pollution and ambient (outdoor) air pollution
simultaneously. Though kerosene is considered to still be cleaner than charcoal and other
biomass, it is still has significantly negative health and environmental impacts that are not shared
by LPG usage. As a result, the Indian government has invested heavily in LPG subsidy programs
primarily targeting poor and middle-income households. The country has seen a significant
increase in LPG connections, and has plans to further expand the program. Thus, I use LPG
connections in India as a proxy for improve cookstove technology, as LPG stoves are cleaner
than chulhas and kerosene stoves.

Here, an ‘eligible woman’ is described as an ever-married woman aged 15-49. DS3 has data from a questionnaire
where an eligible woman in the household is the respondent.
10
Data from DS3 were used wherever possible for consistency of responses, and data from DS2 were used if data
from DS3 were not available.
11
Sample weights for the household were assigned to observations in this analysis to account for differences in
geographical population distribution.
12
A chulha is a small earthen or brick stove that uses wood, charcoal, animal dung, or crop residue (biomass).
Chulha use has been compared to cigarette smoking in terms of its negative individual and public health impacts.
9
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Figure 1: Cooking Fuel Use By Location
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Figure 1 reflects this switch to cleaner fuels – LPG is by far the most used fuel in this
sample in both urban and rural areas, which likely speaks to the success of the fuel subsidy
program in encouraging people in both areas to move towards cleaner fuels. This is likely the
result of intelligent social marketing on behalf of the programs, as well linking participation in
these programs to financial inclusion through access to banking facilities. However, the graphs
illustrate a lingering reliance on kerosene and charcoal among rural households, which suggests
some difference in fuel usage characteristics based on location. This is further explored in the
regression analysis of factors affecting LPG use later in this paper.
Table 2 (see Appendix) shows that when households do have to collect wood fuel for
charcoal, over half of the women who responded have to collect it at least once a week. This
shows that women do have to engage in the process of fuel collection frequently enough that it is
an established part of their household routines.
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Figure 2: Cooking Fuel Use By Main Purpose

Figure 2 is illustrative of the different uses of each fuel within the pooled sample. Among
households that do use LPG, it is reported that its main use is for cooking, followed by a
combination of energy-consuming activities. Kerosene, unlike LPG, is largely used for lighting.
One possible explanation for this could be that households who have access to the LPG subsidy
program might have switched from charcoal directly to LPG, thereby leapfrogging over the
‘middle step’ of using kerosene. At the time of the public subsidy deployment, some households
have presumably been using kerosene for a long time and have found the most suitable and
efficient ways for their families to make the most use out of a given fuel – kerosene and LPG
would be suited for this diverse set of needs. However, since the intervention focused on
switching to LPG as a cooking fuel, it is possible that households that switched from chulhas to
ICs primarily use LPG for cooking instead of charcoal. These households still rely on kerosene
for other energy needs, likely because they have not had enough time to integrate LPG into other
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energy consuming activities in their lives, and because of a lack of access to electricity.
Additionally, most households report not using charcoal at all, but those that do report using it
primarily for cooking. This could be supported by the fact that kerosene and charcoal are
imperfect substitutes in terms of how they meet different energy needs.

3.2.2 Model
I investigate what factors might have a significant effect on increasing the likelihood of
the adoption of LPG for a given household, controlling for demographic, geographic, and socioeconomic factors. I ran a probit regression with a dependent variable that captures LPG usage for
cooking, and women’s access to education as my independent variable of interest, the results of
which are displayed in Table 3. I ran the same regressions using a linear probability model
(LPM) as well, and the results are reported in Table 4. The directions in which the coefficients
move is the same as in the probit model, and the coefficients for the independent variables are of
similar magnitude. I chose to run a probit model instead of the LPM because my outcome of
interest is coded as a binary variable ranging from 0 to 1. The probit model is thus better fitted
for the dependent dummy variable and predicts the probability of the adoption of LPG for
cooking.13 The model was calculated with robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity.

Pr(LPGcook) = Φ(𝛽0 + 𝛽1Educ + 𝛽2Educ*Urban + 𝛽3Lincome + 𝛽4Lincome*Urban + 𝛽5Women
+ 𝛽6Women*Urban + 𝛽7Men+ 𝛽8Age + 𝛽9Hindu + 𝛽10Urban + μ)
(1)

I used the dependent variable LPGcook, which equals 1 if the respondent reports that the
main use of LPG in their household is for the purpose of cooking, and 0 if otherwise. The main

13

The results of the regression using a linear probability model (LPM) are displayed in Table 4 (Appendix 2).
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independent variable of interest, Educ, is a proxy for bargaining power in the household. Educ
captures the highest level of education attained by an adult woman (over 21 years old) in the
household. I chose this variable over variables that described the education level of the
respondent or mother-in-law (only two of the women in the household) because the households
that report having between 0 and 3 women living in them comprise 97 percent of the sample,
with 7.60 percent of the sample reporting that 3 women live in the household. I hypothesize that
the coefficient on Educ will be positive and significant.
Demographic controls used in this regression include the log of total household income
(Lincome), the number of adult men and women in the household over 21 years of age (Women
and Men), and religion (coded as Hindu = 1 if the respondent identifies the head of the household
as Hindu, and 0 if otherwise). The log of Income was used if values for Income were greater than
or equal to 0. This was to account for the wide range in orders of magnitude for observations within
this variable. Additionally, I chose to limit the characterization of religion to Hindi and non-Hindu,
despite the fact that both categories comprise heterogenous groups of religious identity. I made
this choice for two reasons: first, the vast majority of the sample reports that the head of the
household is Hindu (81.62 percent). Moreover, in some places in India, identifying as Hindu
translates into higher social capital and bargaining power, and different cultural norms.
I chose to use a probit model with robust standard errors. I report the marginal effects
from the probit estimations instead of the estimated coefficients, for ease of interpretation. Three
empirical models are estimated, one with the pooled sample controlling for urban/rural
characteristics, and two that were disaggregated by urban/rural characteristics to investigate the
effects of women’s education in areas where social norms are likely to be different and influence
bargaining power.
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3.2.3 Results and Limitations
The results of this model are presented in Table 3. The variables Educ, Lincome, and
Women were estimated along with the interaction terms for each of them with Urban. As a result,
the coefficients in Column 1 show the results of those three variables in the rural subsample.
From Column 1, the independent variable of interest, Educ, is significant in rural
households and carries the anticipated positive sign. According to these results, the level of
education of the adult woman in a rural household with the highest level of education is a
positive predictor of the household’s choice to use LPG primarily for cooking. That is, an
increase in education by 1 grade level for the most-educated woman in a rural household,
increases the likelihood that the household uses the cleaner fuel alternative by 3.66 percent,
significant at the 1 percent level. The results in Columns 2 and 3 support this hypothesis as well.
In urban households, an increase in education by 1 grade level for the most-educated woman in
the household increases the likelihood that the household uses the cleaner fuel alternative by 4.61
percent. This coefficient is smaller than for rural households. Moreover, the coefficient on the
difference between the urban and rural effects is also significant, showing that the effect of
increasing women’s education (and subsequently, bargaining power) on LPG use is magnified in
rural areas when compared to urban households. This suggests that perhaps due to prevailing
social norms, the marginal effect of a woman having more bargaining power in terms of more
education is greater in areas where it is less common for women to have an education.
This supports my hypothesis that increasing a woman’s bargaining power within the
household does increase the likelihood that the improved household outcome will be achieved,
specifically using the adoption of LPG (the cleanest option, the other two being charcoal and
kerosene) as the proxy for the improved household outcome.
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Additionally, the control variables Lincome, Age, Women and Men are statistically
significant. Like Educ, Lincome is interacted with Urban to give Lincome*Urban. The
coefficients in Column 1 indicate that an increase in income corresponds to a 3.49 percent
increase in the likelihood of a rural household adopting LPG as its primary cooking fuel.
Similarly, the coefficients in column 3 indicate that an increase in income corresponds to a 7.40
percent increase in the likelihood of an urban household adopting LPG as its primary cooking
fuel. However, the difference between these two is not significant. This could perhaps be due to
social and cultural factors having more of an influence in households making the decision to use
LPG or not, and goes against some literature on the income-energy ladder (Reddy, 2004).
Surprisingly, having a higher number of women in the household significantly decreases
the probability of using LPG as a cooking fuel by approximately 1 percent in rural households,
by 3.6 percent in urban areas, and by 0.7 percent overall. The difference between the effect of
this variable in urban and rural households is not significant. Conversely, having more adult men
in the house significantly increases the probability of using LPG by 1.37 percent overall. Having
a Hindu-identifying head of household significantly decreases the probability of using LPG as
the primary cooking fuel in the household by 4.78 percent overall.
Finally, the differences in magnitude of LPG adoption between urban and rural areas is
illustrated by the coefficient on the variable Urban. Living in an urban area increases the
likelihood of adopting LPG as the primary cooking fuel by 50.1 percent, significant at the 1
percent level. This supports the initial hypothesis and previous literature on the subject. The
magnitude of the coefficient confirms my initial motivation for disaggregating the sample to see
whether the independent variable of interest and other control variables have different effects/the
same effects of differing magnitudes in both settings.
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Within this analysis, there are limitations to the model I have presented. First, the
empirical model in this paper largely relies on self-reported data, which is subject to a bias. The
model itself would have better reflected preferences of fuel choices had an ordered probit model
been used as is frequent in the literature (Reddy, 2004), however I did not have enough
observations from subsamples using charcoal and kerosene to be able to yield analysis of
significant power. Additionally, the proxies chosen for improved household outcomes are far
from perfect. It is difficult to gather data directly about improved environmental outcomes. For
this survey I used the adoption of the cleaner fuel (LPG) as a proxy for the improved outcome
without actually quantifying the benefit to the household, since I assumed (based off of the
literature) that an improved outcome would follow form the switch from biomass to LPG.
Additionally, if I had access to a better proxy that measured the actual environmental benefit, it
would have been worthwhile to use a fixed effects model using the IHDS-I and IHDS-II that
could track household outcomes over time, since many of the IHDS-II in 2011-2012 households
were ones that were re-interviewed from the IHDS-I in 2005. This, in conjunction with a more
specific proxy for women’s empowerment, could yield more robust insights about causal
relationships between women’s bargaining power and the adoption of green technology. Some of
these concerns are addressed in through the creation of the experimental design.

4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
4.1. Motivation
As pointed out by Zimmerman (2012), most studies that seek to identify instances of
gender discrimination in the allocation of household outcomes such as consumption, health, or
expenditures are constrained by the unavailability of data. Household consumption and
expenditure data is usually only available at the household level, rather than at the individual
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level. Furthermore, bargaining power as a variable is unobservable – these studies must also use
proxies for bargaining power, in addition to those used for preferences. As noted by Agarwal
(1997), income can often serve as an endogenous factor in outcome differentials, obscuring the
causality between exogenous increases in earned income and bargaining power in the household.
Randomized control trials (RCTs), where participants are randomly assigned to control or
treatment groups, are one way to overcome this issue and reveal the intricacies of decisionmaking processes within households more clearly (Doss, 2013).
These issues can and have been addressed in a few ways. The problem of endogeneity
has been addressed in experiments by using a ‘natural experiment’ framework, where a policy
change or exogenous change to income outside of the control of the household creates natural
control and treatment groups (Duflo, 2003; Qian, 2008). Kusago and Barham (2001) directly
surveyed household members on how they would spend an extra $40 on different expenditure
categories, and created a measure of preference heterogeneity to include within their model.
Similarly, RCTs are another method of circumventing the problem of endogeneity to some
extent. Many conditional cash transfer programs have utilized the design of RCTs to test their
efficacy.
To address the data and endogeneity constraints within my own empirical model, I
incorporate a theoretical experimental design based on previous research in intra-household
allocation to move beyond these limitations.
The experiment would aim to test whether a targeted increase in access to credit (i.e., the
increase in access to credit is directed either towards the man or the woman in the household)
results in a significant difference in the rates of ICs adoption between men and women in rural
areas in India. The hypothesis the experiment operates on is based on the theoretical model
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outlined above. I hypothesize that given increased access to credit, women would
disproportionately increase household budget expenditure on ICs relative to men. Increased
access to credit has been chosen as the specific intervention to address credit market
inefficiencies given the choice of technology.
ICs were chosen specifically because of the asymmetrical distribution of benefits of
adoption to women, thus creating a preference differential that could be realized as a result of
increased bargaining power (Jeuland & Pattanayak, 2012). Subsequently, as Jack (2011) notes,
access to credit is needed most when the upfront cost of technology adoption is highest – this is
by and large true for the financing of stoves. Previous studies have largely used education,
income or asset ownership as proxies for increasing women’s bargaining power. Another such
proxy is increasing women’s access to credit, which could have similar effects to that of
increased earned income. This is a particularly salient proxy given the high up-front costs of ICs,
which would require most consumers (particularly rural ones) to have access to consumer
finance to make the purchase. Microfinance organizations are well-positioned to address the
constraints that women face in borrowing from commercial banks, such as lack of access to
collateral, lack of asset ownership, social norms, lack of information, and other institutional and
legal barriers. Though there is a lack of academic consensus on whether microfinance does
‘empower’ women, it has been shown to have a positive impact on income and serves as a useful
tool for the promotion of new technologies (UN, 2009). Microfinance organizations are able to
address the constraints women face more specifically through group-lending programs.
4.2 Specification
The experimental set up here would thus follow the RCT design, wherein a sample of
households would be randomly sorted into two groups with similar socioeconomic
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characteristics and culturally-based influencing factors (such as income, education levels,
religion, and caste – which would be disaggregated into high caste and lower caste
communities). The nature of the intervention would be a 2x2 design as follows: one group would
be subject to an intervention where women are given increased access to credit (1), and the other
would be subject to an intervention where men are given increased access to credit (2) in the
form of a loan. Within groups (1) and (2), each group would be further stratified into a treatment
and control group, based on our subgroups of interest – i.e. gender. So, in group (1) there would
be two randomly assigned groups of households: one group where women are given increased
access to credit (treatment group 1) and another group where women are not given increased
access to credit (control group 1). Similarly in group (2), two groups would exist – one where
men are given access to credit (treatment group 2) and another where men are not given access to
credit (control group 2).
Additionally, to ensure that the option of adopting green technology is incorporated into
the household’s budgeting process, the experiment would be linked to a menu of consumption
options. Both treatment and control groups would receive a menu of options to choose from,
which would include the improved cookstove as a possible component of budget allocation. The
menu of options would be catered to the economic (income, education) and socio-cultural
(religion, caste) characteristics of the community, as high-caste, highly educated rural
households would likely have different potential baskets of consumption than low-caste, lowincome rural households. This would help ensure that the increased access in credit is directed
towards incentivizing the green technology, and not influencing consumption in general.
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Figure 5: 2x2 experimental setup
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The next point of concern is the level of randomization in the study. Randomization is
necessary to ensure that there is no contamination across groups as a result of treatment. In this
experimental design, I would need to ensure that the risk of treatment groups communicating
with one another about having received the increased access to credit is minimal, as this would
affect how both treatment and control groups would respond to the intervention. The next
question to address would be at what level the groups could be randomized so as to generate a
credible test.
The sample size and level at which the sample is randomized is important both for
analytical and practical reasons. Treatment and subsequent data collection through interviews is
expensive, thus the sample size needs to be optimized. Furthermore from a statistical standpoint,
the significance of the true effect of treatment (measured through averages in the treatment and
control group) depend both on the magnitude of the true effect, the sample size, and the
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homogeneity of the population. 14 Ideally, on average, the sample size would be large enough that
observable and unobservable characteristics of the treatment and control populations are the
same.
In this experiment, the treatment level is at the household – one person in each household
receives the intervention, so no two individuals within the same household would be recipients
of the increased credit flow. Randomization could occur at:
1. The household/group level, where households in the same village are randomly selected
to form treatment and control groups within the same village.
2. The village level, where a certain number of households are randomly selected within
each village to receive treatment across villages in the same sub-district (village
cluster).15 Here, the intensity of treatment can be varied across villages (i.e. the number
of treatment households can be increased or decreased across villages). Other strategies
include assigning all villages partial treatment (where 50% of households receive
treatment) or assign full treatment to some (say 50%) villages.
3. The sub-district level, where a certain number of villages in a sub-district are randomly
selected to have all the households as recipients of the treatment while all the households
in the other villages in the sub-district are randomly chosen to be the control group.
As the scope of randomization widens, a trade-off begins to appear. The smaller the
scope, the easier it is to collect reliable data and information through interviews – however,
keeping the scope of the experiment small runs the risk of cross-contamination from
informational spillovers. For instance, if the intervention is randomized at the household level,

Here, the true effect tested would be the increase in women’s propensity to spend on cleaner cooking
technologies.
15
In India, the hierarchy of government administration is organized (in order of decreasing geographical scope) at
the following levels: national, state, district, sub-district (village clusters), and village. Here, a district
14
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non-recipient households in the same village might find out and be dissatisfied, thereby
reiterating the practical constraints of the experimental setup. To mitigate this potential
dissatisfaction, recipients should either be chosen arbitrarily or randomly, or some combination
of the two. Another potential concern is cross-contamination through crossovers (movement to
treatment or control groups). This is less of a concern since it would be difficult for members of
recipient households to move into non-recipient households or vice versa, and it would also be
difficult for entire families to move to or from recipient villages, depending on the level of
randomization.
The power test also needs to be taken into account when selecting sample size and the
level of randomization. As demonstrated by Thornton (2011), if the experiment is randomized at
the individual/household level, a large minimum detectable effect (MDE) of 0.5 is achievable
with either a) a minimum of 144 responses with under 50% treatment and full compliance or b) a
minimum of 576 observations with 50% compliance. Moving away from individual
randomization results in a loss in precision from an increase in MDE.
Taking into consideration both practical and statistical concerns regarding randomization
and its limits, I would recommend that the intervention be randomized at the village level (level
2) so as to provide flexibility in treatment intensity/administration; achieve a balance within the
trade-off between ease of data collection and risk of spillover cross-contamination; and maintain
realistic expectations about budgetary limitations.

5. CONCLUSION
The primary goal of this paper is to incorporate the rigorous body of empirical research
on household bargaining models into the architecture of climate change financing. International
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political and development agendas are beginning to emphasize the need for access to clean and
affordable energy not merely as an afterthought in project planning, but at the heart of any
reasonable sustainable development initiative moving forward, particularly given the pressing
need for climate change mitigation in light of the recent IPCC report. This is evidenced not only
by the inclusion of ‘Affordable and Clean Energy’ as Goal 7 of the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals, but also by the focus of recent policy brief aiming to integrate issues of
gender and clean energy access into the broader global development agenda. (UN, 2015; UNDP,
2011; UNDP, 2013).
Many households in developing countries face the barrier of high up-front costs standing
between them and the adoption of green technologies that have the potential to confer improved
environmental outcomes to the community at large, as well as improved health and livelihood
outcomes within the household itself. Though the jury is still out on its efficacy, microfinance is
often used as a means to bridge that funding gap – more specifically, microcredit poses one
possible avenue to facilitate the adoption of these technologies.
There seems to be a missing link between empirical literature on improving household
outcomes and policy initiatives that recognize that women in developing countries are
simultaneously on the receiving end of the burden of climate change and in the best position to
improve environmental outcomes at the household level. With this paper, I aim to both motivate
the need for more robust empirical research linking the two with my own economic analysis, as
well as provide the first steps for an empirical design that could provide the basis of an
experimental design to collect data that would help test this theory in the real world, and gather
data on the realized outcomes of increasing women’s access to credit.
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These limitations in the data and empirical model in this paper can be addressed through
the collection of survey data from the experimental design outlined above. Avenues for future
research could expand on this experimental design to test for improved outcomes with other
green household technologies, such as reforestation initiatives, off-grid solar energy, and
agricultural technology improvements. This might be especially pertinent for technologies where
improved household outcomes and environmental benefits are easier to measure and analyze.
Moreover, I aim to have challenged ideas of women in developing countries as a vulnerable
populations with limited means and agency, as well as assumptions that these same women are,
by virtue of being on the receiving end of the adverse outcomes of climate change, able to secure
the desirable outcome of adopting greener technology within their households as a part of their
rational consumption choices.
Policy that aims to finance the adoption of green technology for households must ground
itself in an evidence-based understanding of the complex dynamics that shape large consumption
decisions, and the gathering of that evidence must flow from economic theory. In providing this
theoretical and empirical background to my experimental design, it is my hope to gain a more
expansive empirical understanding of women’s role in climate change mitigation strategies.
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Appendix
A1: Tables
Table 1: Highest female adult education level in household
Highest female adult
Freq.
Percent
Freq.
Percent
Freq.
education
(Pooled)
(Rural)
(Rural)
(Urban)
None
14,949
37.82
12,352
45.85
2,596

Percent
(Urban)
20.64

1st class

169

0.43

150

0.56

20

0.16

2nd class

537

1.36

415

1.54

122

0.97

3rd class

845

2.14

635

2.36

210

1.67

4th class

1,138

2.88

846

3.14

292

2.32

5th class

3,207

8.12

2,345

8.70

863

6.86

6th class

1,035

2.62

705

2.62

330

2.62

7th class

2,001

5.06

1,284

4.77

717

5.70

8th class

2,851

7.21

1,928

7.16

923

7.34

9th class

2,662

6.74

1,636

6.07

1,027

8.16

Secondary (10th class)

3,513

8.89

1,842

6.84

1,671

13.28

11th class

516

1.3

305

1.13

211

1.68

High secondary (12th class)

2,677

6.77

1,367

5.07

1,310

10.41

Bachelor’s

2,210

5.59

754

2.80

1,456

11.57

Above bachelor’s

1,212

3.07

378

1.40

835

6.63

Total

39,523

100

26,941

100

12,582

100

Note: The sample sizes for urban and rural subsamples are lower than the full sample used in the
regression. This is because the IHDS-II is a survey, and restricting based on different variables results in
observations being dropped due to some questions being left unanswered by respondents.
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Table 2: Frequency of fuel collection (adult women)
FuelFreq
Freq.
Percent
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Quarterly
Yearly
Total

2,724
6,825
1,728
584
365
12,226

22.28
55.82
14.13
4.78
2.99
100

Note: The sample size is lower than the full sample used in the regression. This is because the IHDS-II is
a survey, and restricting based on different variables results in observations being dropped due to some
questions being left unanswered by respondents.
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Table 3: Determinants of LPG Use (Probit Model)
Rural Interacted Urban Effect
(1)
(2)
Educ
0.0366***

Urban
(3)

(0.00106)
Educ*Urban
Lincome

(0.000637)
-0.0203***

0.0461***

(0.00138)

(0.002512)

0.0349***

0.0256***

(0.00459)

(0.002220)

Lincome*Urban
Women

Pooled Sample
(4)
0.0261***

-0.00861

0.07403***

(0.00650)

(0.01324)

-0.0102*

-0.00671*

(0.00616)

(0.004040)

Women*Urban

-0.00265

-0.03627**

(0.00798)

(0.01652)

0.0137***

0.0137***

0.0137***

0.0128***

(0.00393)

(0.00393)

(0.00393)

(0.00341)

0.00331***

0.00331***

0.00331***

0.00269***

(0.00033)

(0.00033)

(0.00033)

(0.000264)

-0.0478***

-0.0478***

-0.0478***

-0.0423***

(0.00844)

(0.00844)

(0.00844)

(0.00706)

0.501***

0.501***

0.501***

0.253***

(0.06580)

(0.06580)

(0.06580)

(0.0066)

Pseudo R2

0.1917

0.1917

0.1917

0.1917

Observations

39,430

39,430

39,430

39,430

Men
Age
Hindu
Urban

Note: Probit estimations. The reported coefficients in columns (1) and (2) are marginal effects. Standard
errors in parenthesis. (***, **, *) indicates statistical significance at the (1, 5, 1) level. Dependent variable
= 1 if LPG fuel is used primarily for cooking. Coefficients in (1) denote effect of the interacted
independent variables on the dependent variable for the rural population (i.e., where Urban==0).
Coefficients in (2) denote the isolated effect of the interaction term, i.e. the difference in the effect on the
dependent variable between the urban and rural subsamples for interacted variables. Coefficients in (3)
denote the effect of the interacted independent variables on the dependent variable for the urban
population (i.e., where Urban==1). Column (4) shows the effect of the independent variable on the full
sample, and is estimated by running the probit model without the interaction terms.
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Table 4: Determinants of LPG Use (Linear Probability Model)
Rural Interacted Urban Effect
Urban
(1)
(2)
(3)
Educ
0.0313***
(0.00086)
Educ*Urban
Lincome
Lincome*Urban
Women
Women*Urban

Pooled Sample
(4)
0.0332***
(0.000599)

-0.0140***

-0.0203***

0.0173***

(0.00126)

(0.00138)

(0.000925)

0.0254***

0.0399***

(0.00244)

(0.002360)

0.00286

-0.00861

0.02831***

(0.00540)

(0.00650)

(0.004847)

-0.0066

-0.0208***

(0.00500)

(0.004150)

-0.00603

-0.00265

-0.01263**

(0.00733)

(0.00798)

(0.00592)

0.0122***

0.0122***

0.0122***

0.0122***

(0.00341)

(0.00341)

(0.00341)

(0.00341)

0.00284***

0.00284***

0.00284***

0.00284***

(0.00026)

(0.00026)

(0.00026)

(0.00026)

-0.0418***

-0.0418***

-0.0418***

-0.0418***

(0.00705)

(0.00705)

(0.00705)

(0.00705)

0.322***

0.322***

0.322***

-0.195***

(0.05980)

(0.05980)

(0.05980)

-0.0249

Constant

-0.218***

-0.218***

-0.218***

-0.218***

R2

0.23

0.23

0.23

0.23

Observations

39,430

39,430

39,430

39,430

Men
Age
Hindu
Urban

Note: LPM estimations. The reported coefficients in columns (1) and (2) are marginal effects. Standard
errors in parenthesis. (***, **, *) indicates statistical significance at the (1, 5, 1) level. Dependent variable
= 1 if LPG fuel is used primarily for cooking. Coefficients in (1) denote effect of the interacted
independent variables on the dependent variable for the rural population (i.e., where Urban==0).
Coefficients in (2) denote the isolated effect of the interaction term, i.e. the difference in the effect on the
dependent variable between the urban and rural subsamples for interacted variables. Coefficients in (3)
denote the effect of the interacted independent variables on the dependent variable for the urban
population (i.e., where Urban==1). Column (4) shows the effect of the independent variable on the full
sample, and is estimated by running the LPM without the interaction terms.
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A2: Summary statistics
Variable name
LPGcook

LPGfuel

Educ

Income
LIncome
Women
Men
Age
Hindu

Urban

Description
1 if respondent reports
that the main use of
LPG in household is
cooking, 0 if otherwise
1 if household uses
LPG for any purpose, 0
if otherwise (DS2)
Highest education level
attained by an adult
woman in household
(DS3)
Total household income
(DS3)
Log of household
income
No. of adult women in
HH (DS3)
No. of adult men in HH
(DS3)
Age measured in years
1 if head of household’s
religion is Hindu, 0 if
otherwise (DS2)
1 if urban household, 0
if rural household
(DS3)

Mean
0.3490

Std. Dev.
0.4766

Min
0

Max
1

0.4397

0.4964

0

1

5.486

5.1780

0

16

125301

20300

100

11400000

11.23

1.0011

4.605

16

1.602

0.8166

0

9

1.513

0.9103

0

9

22.72
0.8207

10.323
0.3836

1
0

62
1

0.3208

0.4668

0

1
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A3: Theoretical model
Assume that there exists a multi-member household where decisions on expenditure are made by
two utility-maximizing members, the man (m) and woman (w). Hoddinott & Haddad (1995) use
a Nash equilibrium model to show that as income share of one member in the household rises, it
is clearly reflected in the pattern of household expenditure because the share of household
income spent on that individual’s preferred set of goods will rise.
max UW (gt, ~gtm, ~gtf) subject to  * (~gtm, gt) ≤ yf
Similarly,

max UM (gt, ~gtf, ~gtm) subject to  * (~gtf, gt) ≤ ym

Where
UW is the utility of the woman in the household
UM is the utility of the man in the household
gt is the purchase of green technology
~gtm is a vector of the purchase of non-green technology goods made from the man’s
income. The woman takes as a given when making decisions to maximize her utility.
~gtf is a vector of the purchase of non-green technology goods made from the woman’s
income
 is the associated vector of prices associated with non-green technology goods
yf is the woman’s earned income
ym is the man’s income.
While Hoddinott & Haddad (1995) use a vector of purchases and their corresponding
prices to compute preference, I am assuming a simpler model that only takes into account the
preferences of men and women with regard to the purchase of green technology. If both m and w
derive different utilities from green technology consumption, they would realize different
outcomes in the pursuit of utility maximization. Thus, when one member’s bargaining power in
the household increases, they have more power for their preferences to be realized and reflected
in household consumption decisions over the other member’s. The experimental design in this
paper can be used to test this theory. By increasing either m or w's bargaining power through
access to credit from microfinance programs, we could test whether one has an increased
propensity to purchase green technology for the household over the other in the pursuit of utility
maximization.

